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NOTES

It would seem that a similar argument could be made for a uniform system
of water administration in Wyoming.
The "jurisdictional fact" doctrine was established in the federal courts
by Crowell v. Benson.25 This case involved review of a workmen's compensation award under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. 26
In order for the Commissioner to have jujrisdiction the injury must have
occurred upon the navigable waters of the United States and the relationship of master and servant must have existed. Here the court held that
where the determination of certain facts was essential to the jurisdiction
of the agency, it would make an independent determination of both the law
and the facts. Although this doctrine has been severely criticized, 27 it was
followed by a circuit court in the subsequent case of Pittsburgh S.S. Corp.
v. Brown.28 No similar question seems to have been raised in Wyoming.
It is apparent that review of agency decisions has not been a fertile
field of litigation in the Wyoming courts. Perhaps it has been a field
in which there have not been many cases because the legislature has not
seen fit to entrust the agencies to carry out the legislative delegation impartially. But could not just as much control be exercised over the
agencies with review provisions similar to those governing federal administrative agencies? If agencies are going to be merely examiners for the
courts, then we have a misconception of the true function and value of
administrative agencies.
GLENN W. BUNDY

DUE DILIGENCE REQUIRED FOR SERVICE BY PUBLICATION

In attempting to obtain jurisdiction by constructive service over a
defendant whose address is unknown, the plaintiff's attorney is immediately confronted with the question of how far he must go in his search,
and exactly what he must do in order to satisfy the requirements of due
diligence that are a necessary and essential part of this type of service.
Although the requirements of the states vary, from a procedural approach
there seem to be two general classifications. First are those jurisdictions
that require an order for publication of the necessary notices after the
court has been satisfied from the plaintiff's affidavit that due diligence
has been exercised in attempting to find the defendant. The other group
of jurisdictions merely require that an affidavit be filed before service
by publication be made.
The requirement seems to be, in the. first group mentioned above, that
the court should decide from the facts set forth in the affidavit of the
25.
26.
27.
28.

285 U.S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed 598 (1932).
44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq.
See DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 920 (1951).
171 F.2d 175 (7th Cir., 1948).
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plaintiff if there has been an adequate search.' It is required that the
affidavit contain facts concerning the search, and a mere statement that
the plaintiff has not been able to make personal service after a diligent
search is the affiant's conclusion and not that of the court.2 What constitutes due diligence is generally held to be a question of law. 8 In an
early California case it was said that between the statute and the affidavit
there is a relation which is analogous to that existing between a pleading
and the evidence which supports it. The ultimate facts of the statute must
be proved in the affidavit by showing the probatory facts upon which
each ultimate fact depends. These ultimate facts are conclusions drawn
from the existnce of other facts, and the disclosure is the special office
of the affidavit. 4
The statutory requirements for obtaining constructive service in
Wyoming5 are of the second classification. These statutes are practically
the same (except for some added causes of action) as they were when first
introduced.6 They are similar to the Ohio statutes from which they were
7
adopted.
The Wyoming statutes requires no court order prior to publication.3
However, the failure to file the affidavit has been fatal to the action and
has had the effect of rendering a foreclosure sale a nullity.9
An affidavit stating the ultimate facts in the language of the statute is
sufficient. The accepted opinion in this state for many years among
lawyers, cours, and the legislatures has been that an affidavit stating the
ultimate facts in the language of the statute is sufficient, and the courts
are not disposed, in view of an established practice for manyyears in the
state, to sold otherwise and thereby disturb perhaps hundreds of titles
and marital settlements.1 0
The Wyoming Supreme Court has indicated quite definitely what it
will expect, at least in part, as a satisfactorily diligent search. In one case
a city attempted to foreclose a lien for improvements against some realty.
The owner of the property, a non-resident, had been paying her county
taxes and city water assessments for some time and her correct address
was on file in both the county and city offices. The city, in attempting to
obtain constructive service, incorrectly spelled the owner's name and used
as her last known address the address of the property sought to be sold.
By way of dictum the court said of this case that it could no help feeling
1.
2.
3.
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5.
6.
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9.
10.

Mills v. Smiley, 9 Idaho 317, 76 Pac. 783 (1903).
Rome Trust Co. v. Cummings, 123 Misc. 884, 206 N.Y.S. 728 (1924).
Pillsbury v. J. B. Streeter, Jr. Co., 15 N.D. 174, 107 N.W. 40 (1906).
Ricketson v. Richardson, 26 Cal. 149 (1864).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, secs. 3-1101 and 3-1102.
Wyo. (Terr.) Laws 1886, c. 60, secs. 99 and 100.
Baldwin's Revised Ohio Code, secs. 2703.14, 2703.15, and 2703.16.
Clarke v. Shoshoni Lumber Co., 31 Wyo. 205, 224 Pac. 845 (1924).
Elstermeyer v. City of Cheyenne, 57 Wyo. 256, 116 P.2d 231 (1941).
See note 8, supra.
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that the exercise of very little diligence on the part of the city to ascertain
the actual residence of the owner would demand that the records of the
county assessor, county treasurer, and city clerk be examined. These
xecords would be among the very first sources of information on this
matter which would be consulted by anyone really dseirous of ascertaining
the correct non-resident address fo the owner of the real estate." It has
also been held by other courts that a reasonable inquiry could be made
of all persons likely or presumed to know the whereabouts of the person
sought to be notified by publication. This would include agents, relatives,
12
Failure to inquire
business associates, neighbors, and the postmaster.
of the persons in possession of the land in litigation, who were also codefendants, did not constitute diligent search," nor was an inquiry directed
5
at just one friend of the defendant. 14 A search of the city and telephone
6
directories,' an inquiry of the prosecuting attorney who had prosecuted
and of the attorney who had defended the defendant in a prior criminal
action 17 were held to be activities that would aid in the prosecution of a
diligent search. In a case in which the plaintiff or his agents maintained
a continuous but not constant surveillance of the defendant's home, inquired of lodgers there, made repeated calls at his place of business and
8
consulted his employees, there was a finding of satisfactory diligence.'
9
In a recent concurring opinion,' Justice Wolfe of the Utah Supreme
Court set out to enumerate some guiding principles for the determination
of due diligence. Among other things he suggested: "The diligence to be
pursued . . . is that which is reasonable under the circumstances and not
all possible diligence which may be conceived. Nor is it that diligence
which stops just short of the place where if it were continued might
reasonably be expected to uncover an address or the fact of the death of
the person on whom service is sought. There have been cases where the
plaintiff in an action to quiet title or in a divorce action was not untruthful in setting down details in the affidavit to show diligence; yet
like a person who bustles with activity but accomplishes little, makes an
imposing recital of nonproductive diligence. Such type of 'diligence' when
probed may reveal a design to draw attention away from the fact that a
further pursuit might result in an unwelcome disclosure of the address
of the defendant. Due diligence must be tailored to fit the circumstances
of each case. It is that diligence which is appropriate to accomplish the
the end sought and which is reasonably calculated to do so .... Common
sense under the circumstances and regard for the rights of the defendant
should largely govern. The golden rule may also serve as a guide. The
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See note 9, supra.
Krigsby v. Wopschall, 25 S.D. 564, 127 N.W. 605, 37 L.R.A. NS 206 (1910).
Berry v. Howard, 33 S.D. 447, 146 N.W. 577 (1914).
Swain & Marsh v. Chase, 12 Cal. 283 (1859).
Clarkin v. Morris, 178 Cal. 102, 172 Pac. 981 (1918).
Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 417, 217 P.2d 373, 21 A.L.R.2d 919 (1950).
Vorbourg v. Vorbourg, 18 Cal.2d 794, 117 P.2d 875 (1941).
Cone v. Ballard, 68 S.D. 593, 5 N.W.2d 46 (1942).
See note 16, supra.
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admonition should be: Exercise the same diligence to find the defendant
as you would expect him to exercise if he were the plaintiff and you were
the defendant ... I would think it well for the plaintiff, if he is confronted with a doubt as to whether he has used reasonable diligence to
go the 'second mile' in tracing the whereabouts of the defendants or
determine whether they are with the quick or the dead, rather than to
resolve the doubt by not going far enough."
Since the failure to exercise diligence is fatal to the jurisdiction of
the court, the plaintiff's attorney may well ponder the effect of a quiet
title action he has brought that may be reopened, or of a defendant setting
aside a divorce decree after the plaintiff has remarried and perhaps had
children. The defendant, if he learns of the suit, can always make a
special appearance for the sole purpose of denying the court's jurisdiction,
and here bring up the claim that there has not been a diligent search.
This special appearance will relate only to the validity of the constructive
service and does not operate to transform the service into one personal
in character, and upon which a personal judgment can be made. 20 Far
more serious is the institution by the defendant of proceedings to vacate
22
the judgment, 21 which is in effect a new action, equitable in character.
Our statutes will premit a new trial within two years in cases in which the
defendant has been constructively summoned, if fraud has been practiced
by the successful party. 28 In such a suit to set aside a former judgment
quieting title to property, it was held in Idaho that the failure of the
plaintiff in the first suit to exercise reasonable diligence in his search for
the defendant was such negligence as to constitute fraud in fact upon the
court which rendered the prior judgment void. 24 In that case, for one
year the assessment rolls had incorrectly described the non-resident owner's
property, and when the tax payment was made by the owner, it was
credited against the incorrect assessment listing. The property was sold
for delinquent taxes, and the purchaser brought suit to quiet tide, relating
in his affidavit that the owner could not with reasonable diligence be
found. Since the owner's name had been listed correctly on the assessment
rolls both prior and subsequent to the year in which the error in listing
was made, and since the owner had continued to be credited for the payment of her taxes in the years following the error, the plaintiff was held
to have failed to use reasonable diligence in his search.
In a Washington case, the plaintiff brought an action for specific
performance on a written contract to purchase property, claiming he had
paid the full purchase price. No appearance was made by the defendant
in the suit that was commenced by constructive service, and a commissioner
was appointed to convey the property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
20.
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24.

Kimbel v. Osborn, 61 Wyo. 89, 156 P.2d 279 (1945).
Wyo. Comp .Stat. 1945, sec. 3-3801.
State v. Soffietti, 90 Kan. 742, 136 Pac. 260 (1913),
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 3-3810.
Lohr v. Curley. 27 Idaho 739, 152 Pac. 185 (1915).

and see note 8, supra.
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then brought another suit to quiet title against the claims of the defendants. The defendants answered claiming the prior judgment was
procured by the fraud of the plaintiff in that his affidavit for summons
by publication related that the defendants were non-residents and could
not be found, when in fact they were continuous residents of the same
city; that they had engaged in business there; that their names were to be
found in the official city directory and in the telephone directory; and
that their address was known to the agent to whom plaintiff had made
payments on the realty in question. The court said that it was the absence
of good faith on the part of the plaintiff in making such statements that
25
constituted the grounds for attack on the prior judgment.
There is some question if a collateral attack may be made upon a
prior judgment in a case in which the claim relates to the lack of diligent
search that was made when attempting to obtain constructive service. In
this particular aspect, it has been held that for the purpose of challenging
the jurisdiction of the court by reason of the alleged insufficiency of a
diligent search, a special appearance was in the nature of a direct attack.2"
In another Wyoming case, a collateral attack was not allowed on a judgment obtained in a sit begun by constructive service, but the attack was
not based on the lack of diligent search but upon the completeness of the
27
notice given in the publication.
As has been observed, the Wyoming procedure for obtaining constructive service does not require the plaintiff's attorney to convince the
court or anyone but himself, in the original proceedings, that the degree
of diligence he has exercised in attempting to find the defendant has been
sufficient. It is not the purpose of this article to attempt to show that
our procedure is any less desirable than the procedure of those jurisdictions
requiring a court order prior to publication. Even there, fraud has been
practiced on the courts through the false claims that the defendants could
not be found, and people have been unjustly deprived of their property,
and no doubt many questionable divorces have been obtained. However,
in the event of a subsequent attack, it should be pointed out that since
the responsibility rests solely on the plaintiff's attorney to show his honest,
diligent, and good faith efforts to find the defendant, he should be prepared to show exactly what he did in conducting his search. A log of his
activities and the results would seem to be an indispensable part of his
records. And to paraphrase Justice Wolfe, he should exercise at least
the some degree of diligence that he would require others to use in seeking
constructive service on his clients.
HARVEY J. LANDERS
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Schmelling v. Hoffman, 111 Wash. 408, 191 Pac. 618 (1920).
Emelle v. Spinner, 20 Wyo. 507, 126 Pac. 397 (1912).
Clonon v. Closson, 30 Wyo. 1. 215 Pac. 485 (1923).

